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Abstract
We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can
terminate negotiations by accepting the settlement of an arbitrator.
The impact of pragmatic arbitrators -that enforce concessions that
precede their appointment - is compared with that of arbitrators that
act on principle - ignoring prior concessions. We show that while the
impact of arbitration always depends on how costly that intervention is
relative to direct negotiation, the range of scenarios for which it has an
impact, and the precise eﬀect of such impact, does change depending
on the behavior -pragmatic or on principle- of the arbitrator. Moreover
the requirement of mutual consent matters only when the arbitrator
is pragmatic.
Eﬃciency and equilibrium are not aligned since agents sometimes
reach negotiated agreements when an arbitrated settlement is more ef-
ficient and vice-versa. The second type of ineﬃciency is avoided when
arbitrators are appointed by mutual consent and act pragmatically.
What system of arbitration has the best ex-ante performance depends
on the distributions of arbitration and negotiation costs, and each can
be the second best optimal for plausible environments.
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1 Introduction
Arbitration is an extended procedure of dispute resolution by which con-
fronted parties submit to the decision of a third party. It is widely used in
divorce proceedings, to settle grievances in union-management contracts, for
the dissolution of partnerships, and in international trade. The use of arbi-
tration when direct negotiation fails is often included as a clause in contracts
and sometimes it is imposed by law.
To address the eﬀect of arbitration over negotiations, bargaining games
in the shadow of arbitration must be explored. While the literature on ar-
bitration - both empirical and theoretical - is substantial1, most models in
this literature do not contemplate arbitration and bargaining as alternatives
that agents chose along a negotiation process. The notable exceptions are
Compte and Jehiel (1995, 2002) and Manzini and Mariotti (2001).
Arbitration may be viewed as an outside option that bargainers have
along the negotiation process. The literature on bargaining with outside
options2 explores the outcomes of non-cooperative bargaining games when
agents can exit the negotiation and obtain an external payoﬀ. In this liter-
ature, the decision to exit the negotiation can be taken unilaterally by the
bargainers and it yields payoﬀs that are independent of the actions taken
during the negotiation process. To think about arbitration, both assump-
tions may have drawbacks. It is thus important to clarify their distinct
implications, and to study models in which they are relaxed.
The assumption that parties can unilaterally exit the negotiation and
impose the use of arbitration is justified only in environments where, prior
to beginning negotiations, parties commit to allow each other this possibil-
ity. Unilateral exit is thus a reasonable assumption to model bargaining
under compulsory arbitration - a fairly common institutional arrangement
for industrial relations in the U.S. In other cases, however, parties negotiate
without this prior commitment, and the decision to call an arbitrator requires
mutual consent.3 Manzini and Mariotti (2001) sharply make the point that
the voluntary nature of arbitration is of great consequence. They propose a
1See Farber, H. S and M. H. Bazerman (1986), Gibbons (1988) and Kalai, E. and R.
Rosenthal (1979).
2See Shaked and Sutton (1984), Shaked(1994) and Ponsati and Sakovics (1998).
3In Spain and the U.K, for example, labour conflicts are resolved by an arbitrator
only with the consent of both parties. See Manzini and Mariotti (2001) for a thorough
discussion.
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model of bargaining à la Rubinstein where the decision to call an arbitrator
is a joint outside option4 that both agents must agree to take, showing that
outcomes are dramatically diﬀerent from those of games where outside op-
tions are unilateral. The settlements imposed by their arbitrators, however,
are independent of the negotiation history.
The assumption that arbitration outcomes are history independent must
also be scrutinized. While some arbitrators do act on principle - imposing
a fair settlement, independently of the concessions that precede their ap-
pointment - there is strong empirical evidence that this is not usually the
case.5 More often than not, arbitrators do pay attention to the events that
precede their appointment, and act pragmatically imposing state dependent
settlements that maintain previous concessions. Compte and Jehiel (2002)
discuss concession bargaining games where players can unilaterally impose
an arbitrated agreement at which payoﬀs depend on the concessions accu-
mulated prior to exit. They show that endogenous outside options of this
kind promote gradualism in the process of concessions, and thus delay and
ineﬃciency.6
This paper explores concession bargaining games with diﬀerent systems
of arbitration in the background. We consider two agents that take turns at
oﬀering each other concessions, that cannot be claimed back. Negotiations
are costly because each round of concessions takes time and players are im-
patient. When this game is played without an arbitrator in the background,
the outcome is ineﬀcient, agents agree at the Rubinstein shares with one
period of delay.7 When an arbitrator is present, the negotiation process can
be terminated at any point by appointment of the arbitrator. Arbitration is
costly as well, either directly, because a payment to the arbitrator consumes a
portion of the surplus, or indirectly in terms of delay or other implementation
frictions.
There are two rules to appoint the arbitrator, and two norms of conduct
4See Manzini and Mariotti (2002) for a general disccussion not specifically focussed to
arbitration.
5Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984), Bloom (1986), Farber and Bazerman, (1986).
6The main message of Compte and Jehiel (2002) is general and important for many
other applications, since their results apply to a very general class of games admitting
several specifications and interpretations. Their previous unpublished work, Compte and
Jehiel (1995), presents a discussion focussed to arbitration.
7This is in common with Admati and Perry (1991) and Compte and Jeihel (2002).
See the latter for a convincing argument that this is an appropriate assumption to model
negotiations with arbitration in the background.
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by the arbitrator:
1. a) Under unilateral arbitration, players do not need their opponent’s
approval to bring in the arbitrator; b) under consensus arbitration they
do.
2. a) Pragmatic arbitrators, enforce concessions that take place prior to
their appointment and split the contested surplus8; b) arbitrators that
act on principle impose a fair settlement regardless of prior concessions.
Each combination - unilateral pragmatic arbitration, pragmatic arbitra-
tion by consensus, unilateral arbitration on principle and arbitration on prin-
ciple by consensus - constitutes an arbitration system. For each, we char-
acterize the unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium of the corresponding bar-
gaining game for all combinations of negotiation and arbitration costs. We
show that while the impact of arbitration always depends on its cost relative
to the cost of direct negotiations, the range of scenarios for which it has an
impact and the precise eﬀect of such impact changes drastically depending
on whether the arbitrator acts on principle or pragmatically. Moreover, for
pragmatic arbitrators the requirement of consensus also matters.
When arbitrators are pragmatic, there are three possible equilibrium out-
comes: If the cost of arbitration is high, agents ignore arbitration and reach
agreement as they would in the game without arbitrator. At the other ex-
treme, if the cost of arbitration is low, then the arbitrator is appointed at
the beginning of the game. In between there is a range of moderate costs
where arbitration is not used, but it does have impact in the negotiated out-
come; negotiated shares - no longer the Rubinstein shares - approach the
potential arbitrated settlement. The scenarios at which each of these three
outcomes prevail depend on whether arbitration is unilateral or by consensus.
In contrast, when arbitrators act on principle they do not have an impact
on negotiated agreements: either they are appointed immediately or they
are irrelevant. Furthermore, the outcome that prevails is independent of the
requirement of mutual consent.9
8This is a reduced form for Conventional Arbitration, where arbitrators tend to com-
promise between the positions of the two parties. Equal shares of the contested surplus
might also be the expected outcome of Final Oﬀer Arbitration - where the arbitrator is
constrained to choose one of the final two oﬀers.
9This result depends crucially on the concession nature of the bargaining game. As
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We show that eﬃciency and equilibrium outcomes are not aligned. There
are scenarios where a negotiated outcome is the more eﬃcient and players
appoint the arbitrator, and scenarios where arbitration is eﬃcient and yet, in
equilibrium, players negotiate an agreement. Both types of ineﬃciency may
arise when the arbitrator acts on principle or when, being pragmatic, she
can be appointed unilaterally. When pragmatic arbitrators are appointed
by consensus the first type of eﬃciency failure is avoided altogether, but
the second arises in a greater set of scenarios. Hence, whether one type
of arbitrator or another is a priori more eﬀective in promoting eﬃciency
depends on the expected distribution of arbitration and negotiation costs and,
except in pathological environments, none of the three arbitration systems
can be dismissed as generally dominated by the others. For each system of
arbitration we display natural distributions of costs at which it is second best
optimal.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. The unique equilibrium when arbitrators are pragmatic is discussed
in sections 3 and 4, that address, respectively, unilateral appointment and
consensus. Section 5 considers arbitrators that act on principle. Section 6
compares the relative performance of the diﬀerent systems. Conclusions are
gathered in section 6.
2 The model
Two players, i = 1, 2, bargain to share one unit of surplus. Negotiations take
place over time and players are risk neutral and impatient. The diﬀerent
games that we consider combine general negotiation rules with a specification
of the arbitration system. Negotiation rules, arbitration systems, outcomes
and payoﬀs are described next.
1. The negotiation rules: Each period t = 0, 1, 2.... players may
oﬀer each other, in alternating order with player 1 moving first, mutual
concessions; or they may appoint the arbitrator. Thus, at each t, and
given the bargaining state (x1, x2, X), 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x1 + x2 ≤ 1,
X = 1−x1+x2 indicating the cumulative concession to each player in
Manzini and Mariotti (2001) show, when agents are not constrained to maintain their
concessions, an arbitrator appointed by consent that acts on principle may have great
impact.
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periods 0 to t− 1 and the contested surplus, player i must either oﬀer
to concede a non-negative additional portion of the surplus Ci ∈ [0,X],
or she can move to appoint the arbitrator.
2. arbitration systems: An arbitration system specifies the appoint-
ment rule and the conduct of the arbitrator. There are two rules of ap-
pointment: in unilateral arbitration the game ends when a player moves
to appoint the arbitrator; under consensus arbitration, after i moves to
appoint the arbitrator, j must accept or reject. The arbitrator conduct
specifies a partition of the surplus, (A1, A2), Ai ≥ 0, A1 + A2 = 1. A
pragmatic arbitrator appointed in state (x1, x2, X) respects concessions
and splits the remaining surplus, thus Ai = xi+ X2 .When the conduct
of the arbitrator is on principle Ai = 12 .
3. Outcomes and Payoffs: The game terminates when a player con-
cedes all the contested surplus or the arbitrator is appointed. Other-
wise after i moves first at t the game continues with j moving first
at t + 1. Perpetual disagreement yields a zero payoﬀ to both play-
ers. Under a negotiated agreement (x, 1− x, t) each player enjoys the
accumulated concessions at the date of agreement, i.e. payoﬀs are¡
δtx, δt(1− x)
¢
,where 0 < δ < 1. Upon appointment of the arbitrator
in period t at state (x1, x2,X), the arbitrator prescribes a split of the
surplus into shares (A1, A2) , and the cost of arbitration is incurred.
Hence, payoﬀs upon an arbitrated termination are¡
δtαA1, δ
tαA2
¢
,
where 0 < α < 1. A straight forward interpretation is that the arbitra-
tor charges a direct fee proportional to the total surplus.10 Even if the
arbitrator does not charge a fee, arbitration will still be costly as long
as it consumes resources or time.11
The extensive forms are displayed Figures 1 and 2.
10Hence, individual costs of arbitration are proportional to the total share that each
agent obtains. This is unlike in Compte and Jehiel (1995).
11In this later case, we treat the costs of arbitration as delay costs. That is, while 1− δ,
δ = exp(−r), measures the cost imposed by a one period of delay in the negotiations, a
share of the surplus obtained under an arbitrated outcome has a cost 1−α, α = exp(−rh),
where h is the real time interval of delay imposed by the arbitrator. Note that α 6 δ if
and only if h > 1, i.e. if and only if arbitration takes longer than one round of bargaining.
6
Figure 1
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Figure 2
The present games are infinite horizon bargaining games of complete infor-
mation. In spite of their close relationship to the standard bargaining games
of alternating proposals, there are important diﬀerences that it is worthwhile
to clarify. A first and fundamental diﬀerence is that players cannot claim
back what they concede. Consequently, after each positive concession, the
set of continuation strategies available to the players changes because the
possible partitions of the surplus becomes smaller. Moreover, since strategy
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profiles where the first mover concedes the whole surplus can easily be ruled
out as equilibria, negotiated agreements take at least one period. Finally,
observe that proposing to appoint a pragmatic arbitrator is never equivalent
to a concession Ci = X2 . Appointing the arbitrator terminates de game, and
the costs of arbitration are incurred, while a partial concession X
2
leads to
continuation game at t+1 where the contested surplus is 1−x1−x2− X2 . If
the appointment rule requires consensus, moreover, the opponent’s rejection
of arbitration prompts a continuation game at t + 1 leaving the bargaining
state unchanged.
Strategies specify actions at each subgame (a concession or the move to
appoint the arbitrator; and, under consensus, thresholds to approve arbi-
tration), and the set of available actions is constrained by the state of the
game. An equilibrium will be a profile of strategies that constitute a subgame
perfect equilibrium.
In general, strategies may be extremely complex since actions at any sub-
game may depend arbitrarily on the entire history of actions up to that point,
and the set of histories is large. However the bargaining state summarizes
all information of a history that is payoﬀ relevant to a player’s choice, and it
will turn out that for each state (x1, x2,X) a unique optimal action can be
identified by sequential elimination of dominated actions.
Before we proceed to characterize equilibria in bargaining under arbitra-
tion it is useful to discuss the concession game in the absence of arbitration.
Without arbitration, only one player moves at each round and she can either
concede the rest of the pie, X, or make a partial concession Ci ∈ [0, X]. This
game is discussed by Admati and Perry (1991), its unique equilibrium out-
come yields agreement at the standard Rubinstein partition, attained with
one period of delay.
Proposition 1 No Arbitration (Admati and Perry): In the absence of
arbitration, in equilibrium, player 1 concedes δ
1+δ and player 2 concedes the
rest, 1
1+δ , in the following period.
Proof. See Admati and Perry (1991), Proposition 5.1.
Without arbitration players concede up to the point where the opponent,
given that she is impatient, is willing to terminate the game by conceding
what is left. Since payoﬀs are only realized upon agreement, players do not
benefit from the concessions they receive until the game ends. Therefore a
player that has been granted a concession becomes eﬀectively more impatient,
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delay is more costly for her that than for an opponent that has still nothing
assured. If the first concession is large enough the optimal response is to
terminate by conceding the rest of the pie. The minimal concession assures
such response is the responder’s share of the Rubinstein partition.
We now turn our attention to the eﬀect that arbitration has in the pre-
ceding concession game. We start by analyzing a game under pragmatic
arbitrators, that impose state dependent settlements, under the assumption
that they can be appointed unilaterally.
3 Unilateral Pragmatic Arbitration
When agents can appoint the arbitrator unilaterally, arbitration is an outside
option. Consequently, analyzing the equilibrium behavior of players under
unilateral arbitration parallels the analysis of a bargaining game with outside
options. The crucial insight is that outside options are not always relevant,
and this is likewise with arbitration. Moreover, when the outside option is of
endogenous value, varying at the diﬀerent states of bargaining, its relevance
is more delicate than that of fixed outside options.
Pragmatic arbitrators pay some attention to the history of negotiation
that proceeds their appointment and prescribe settlements that are state de-
pendent. Thus arbitration is indeed an option of endogenous value. Precisely,
this endogenous value is
αAi (x1, x2,X) = α
µ
xi +
X
2
¶
;
that is, the accumulated concessions received prior to arbitration are enforced
while the contested surplus is split equally, and the cost of arbitration is
incurred.
At any subgame only one agent moves, and so she controls the rate at
which payoﬀs are discounted. If she concedes, payoﬀs are discounted by δ; if
the arbitrator is appointed, payoﬀs are discounted by α.
To describe equilibrium profiles we will simply specify the optimal action
at each bargaining state. This characterization is given in Lemmata 2 to 5
that examine, in turn, all the state configurations that might arise along play
of the game. The detailed proofs are relegated to the appendix. They involve
tedious but otherwise straightforward sequential deletion of dominated ac-
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tions, showing that for each state under consideration, the appropriate action
survives uniquely.
The following notation simplifies the exposition. Given a state (x1, x2, X)
we denote as CNi the concession of Player i that gives Player j an accumu-
lated concession equivalent to the first mover payoﬀ in the game without
arbitration, that is,
CNi + xj =
δ
1 + δ
.
Similarly, we denote as CAi the concession of Player i that gives Player j an
accumulated concession at which she is indiﬀerent between terminating the
game with total concession or with arbitration, that is,
CAi + xj = α(xj +
X + CAi
2
).
We start by examining the optimal action at states where the active
player has received accumulated concessions that exceed the present value
of obtaining all remaining surplus in one period of delay. If the cost of
arbitration is suﬃciently high, she terminates the game by a total concession;
otherwise the arbitrator is appointed.
Lemma 2 In states where x1 ≥ δ(x1 +X) the optimal actions of Player 1
are:
1. If α ≤ 2δδ+1 concede X.
2. If α > 2δδ+1 opt out in states where α(x1 +
X
2
) > x1; otherwise concede
X.
Let us now examine the optimal actions when the active player faces an
opponent that, upon continuation, will be in the situation of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 In states where x1 < δ(x1 +X) and x2 ≥ δ(x2 +X) the optimal
actions of Player 1 are:
1. If α ≤ 2δδ+1 not to concede anything.
2. If α > 2δδ+1 a concession C
A
1 in states where δ(x1+X−CA1 ) ≥ α(x1+X2 );
otherwise to impose arbitration.
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Our next result addresses optimal actions at states where no agent has
reached the situation of Lemma 2, but one of the two players has received
concessions that exceed δ
1+δ , that is, the payoﬀ that the first mover attains
in the absence of arbitration.
Lemma 4 In states where xi < δ(xi +X), i = 1, 2, and either x1 ≥ δ1+δ or
x2 ≥ δ1+δ the optimal actions of Player 1 are:
1. When x1 ≥ δ1+δ : i) If α ≤
2δ
2δ+1 a concession X. ii) If
2δ
2δ+1 < α ≤
2δ
δ+1
a concession X if x1 ≥ α(x1+ X2 ); otherwise to impose arbitration. iii)
If α > 2δδ+1 a concession C
A
1 if δ(x1 +X − CA1 ) ≥ α(x1 + X2 );otherwise
to impose arbitration.
2. When x2 ≥ δ1+δ : No concession if α ≤
2δ
1+2δ . Otherwise a concession
CA1 if δ(x1 +X − CA1 ) ≥ α(x1 + X2 ) and else to impose arbitration.
Considering states where no agent has yet reached accumulated conces-
sions beyond the first mover’s payoﬀ in the absence of arbitration completes
the exploration of optimal actions.
Lemma 5 In states such that xi < δ1+δ i = 1, 2 the optimal actions of Player
1 are:
1. If α ≤ 2δ
2δ+1 a concession C
N
1 .
2. If α > 2δ
2δ+1 a concession C1 = Max
£
CN1 , C
A
1
¤
whenever δ(x1 + X −
C1) ≥ α(x1 + X2 ); or else to impose arbitration.
With a full characterization of the optimal action at each possible bar-
gaining state the full characterization of the equilibrium outcomes is straight-
forward. It suﬃces to observe that the optimal actions at the initial state
(0, 0, 1) are given in Lemma 5. They must necessarily yield either an ar-
bitrated termination or a negotiated agreement that occurs in two steps of
concession.
For each state that satisfies the conditions of Lemma 5, the diﬀerent
optimal action scenarios generate a partition in the set of parameters. For
the initial state (0, 0, 1), it is immediate to check that the induced partition
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is as follows. The parameters (α, δ) for which CNi =
δ
1+δ is the optimal action
must lie in the set
H =
½
(α, δ) such that α ≤ 2δ
1 + 2δ
¾
;
and the optimal action is CAi =
α
2−α at set of parameters
M =
½
(α, δ) such that
2δ
1 + 2δ
6 α < 1 + 2δ −
p
1 + 4δ2
¾
.
The arbitrator is appointed if costs are low, i.e. (α, δ) /∈ H ∪M . Figure 3
displays the partition of the set of parameters into scenarios of high, moderate
and low costs of arbitration.
Figure 3
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The main result of this section, characterizing the unique equilibrium
outcome for all possible parameters α and δ, is now immediate from Lemma
5 and Lemma 4.
Proposition 6 unilateral pragmatic arbitration: When a pragmatic
arbitrator - allocating shares Ai (x1, x2,X) = xi + X2 - can be appointed uni-
laterally, there is a unique equilibrium. Arbitration prevails if and only if it
has low cost, (α, δ) /∈ H ∪M, and this outcome occurs at t = 0. Otherwise a
negotiated agreement is reached at t = 1. The negotiated partition ( 1
1+δ ,
δ
1+δ )
prevails under high cost arbitration, (α, δ) ∈ H; when (α, δ) ∈M the split is
(2(1−α)
2−α ,
α
2−α).
It is now immediate to observe that an eﬃcient use of arbitration is not
assured in equilibrium.
Corollary 7 Equilibrium and efficiency are not aligned: Eﬃ-
ciency demands that arbitration prevails if and only if α ≥ δ. When δ ≤ 2
3
,
α ∈
h
δ, 1 + 2δ −
p
1 + 4δ2
i
an ineﬃcient negotiated agreement is reached.
When δ > 2
3
and α ∈
h
1 + 2δ −
p
1 + 4δ2, δ
i
arbitration is used ineﬃciently.
We now turn to examine the consequences of requiring consensus to ap-
point the arbitrator.
4 Pragmatic Arbitration by Consensus
When consensus is required to terminate the negotiation and bring in the
arbitrator, arbitration becomes a joint outside option. Consequently, when
the first mover wishes to appoint the arbitrator, her bargaining power - that
again arises from her control of the rate at which payoﬀs are discounted -
is limited by the veto power of the opponent. In equilibrium, arbitration is
rejected if the responder expects greater payoﬀs from continuing the negoti-
ation than from the arbitrated settlement.
One may think that, if a player has the right to veto arbitration, she
will use this right when the arbitrated outcome is unfavorable, neutralizing
the presence of the arbitrator. Contrary to this intuition, we show that the
presence of an arbitrator in the background remains a strong influence on
the bargaining outcome, even when the consent of both parties is required.
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The characterization of equilibria in the present environment is given
through Lemmata 8 to 10 that establish optimal actions in a way analogous
to Lemmata 2 to 5 of the previous section. Since proposing arbitration is
a dominated action in states where the optimal reply of the opponent is
to reject it, we can safely omit acceptance rules in describing the optimal
actions of players at each state of the game. Thus we will simply specify
the optimal action of the first mover at each bargaining state. The detailed
proofs are in the appendix. They follow along the same arguments used to
prove the analogous results in the previous section. They are, however, a bit
more involved since the constraints imposed by the rule of consensus must
be taken into consideration. The action leading to arbitration is taken in
fewer states than in the game with unilateral arbitration: not only the costs
of arbitration must be suﬃciently low, in addition, the approval of Player 2
must be granted.
Our first observation, however, is that things do not change in states
where the responding agent has received accumulated concessions that ex-
ceed the present value of obtaining all remaining surplus in one period of
delay. In these states, if the proposal of arbitration is not a dominated ac-
tion, its acceptance is assured. Hence the actions that the proposer takes
in equilibrium are not aﬀected by the requirement of consensus. Whatever
action was optimal under unilateral arbitration remains optimal when arbi-
tration needs consensus.
Lemma 8 Consider states where x2 ≥ δ(x2+X). If opting out is the optimal
action of player 1 in unilateral arbitration, the optimal action under consen-
sus arbitration is to propose arbitration. Otherwise, the optimal concessions
of player 1 under consensus or unilateral arbitration coincide.
We now consider states where one of the two players has received conces-
sions that exceed δ
1+δ .
Lemma 9 In states where xi < δ(xi +X), i = 1, 2 and either x1 ≥ δ1+δ or
x2 ≥ δ1+δ the optimal actions of Player 1 are as follows.
1. If x1 ≥ δ1+δ a concession X if either i) α ≤ max
©
2δ
1+2δ , δ
ª
, or ii)
max
©
2δ
1+2δ , δ
ª
< α ≤ 2δ
1+δ with x1 ≥ α(x1 +
X
2
), or iii) max
©
2δ
1+2δ , δ
ª
<
α ≤ 2δ
1+δ with x1 < α(x1+
X
2
) and δ2(x2+X) ≥ α(x2+ X2 ); a concession
CA1 if either iv) max
©
2δ
1+2δ , δ
ª
< α ≤ 2δ
1+δ with x1 < α(x1 +
X
2
) and
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δ2(x2+X) < α(x2+
X
2
) or v) 2δ
1+δ < α and α(x1+
X
2
) < δ(x1+X−CA1 );
otherwise propose arbitration.
2. If x2 ≥ δ1+δ to concede nothing if either i) α ≤ max
©
2δ
1+2δ , δ
ª
or ii)
when x2 ≤ α(x2 + X2 ) and δ
2(x1 + X) ≥ α(x1 + X2 ). Otherwise a
concession CA1 whenever α(x1 +
X
2
) < δ(x1 +X − CA1 ) or else propose
arbitration.
And the characterization of optimal actions is completed with our next
result.
Lemma 10 In states such that xi < δ1+δ i = 1, 2 the optimal actions of
Player 1 are:
1. If α ≤ max
©
2δ
1+2δ , δ
ª
a concession CN1 .
2. If max
©
2δ
1+2δ , δ
ª
< α ≤ 2δ
1+δ and α(xi +
X
2
) ≥ δ2(xi + X) i = 1, 2 a
concession C1 =Max
©
CA1 , C
N
1
ª
whenever α(x1+ X2 ) ≤ δ(x1+X−C1)
or else propose arbitration.
3. If max
©
2δ
1+2δ , δ
ª
< α ≤ 2δ
1+δ and α(xi +
X
2
) < δ2(xi +X) for some i, a
concession CN1 if x1 ≤ 2δ
2−α
α(1+δ) ; otherwise a concession C1 =Max
©
CN1 , C
A
1
ª
.
4. If 2δ
1+δ < α a concession C
A
1 if α(x1 +
X
2
) ≤ δ(x1 +X − CA1 ) or else to
propose arbitration.
To characterize the unique equilibrium outcome it suﬃces to consider the
partition of the set of parameters induced by the optimal action scenarios
of Lemma 10 at the initial state (0, 0, 1). The parameters (α, δ) for which
CNi =
δ
1+δ is the optimal action are in the set
HC = H ∪
½
(α, δ) such that α ≤ min
½
2δ2,
2δ
1 + δ
¾¾
.
And the optimal action is CAi =
α
2−α at parameters that lie in
MC =M/
½
(α, δ) such that α ≤ min
½
2δ2,
2δ
1 + δ
¾¾
.
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When (α, δ) /∈ HC∪MC, the optimal action is to propose arbitration. Figure
4 displays the sets HC and MC.
Figure 4
The unique equilibrium outcome for all possible parameters α and δ, is
now immediate from Lemma 10 and Lemma 9.
Proposition 11 pragmatic arbitration by consensus: When a prag-
matic arbitrator - allocating shares Ai = xi + X2 - is appointed by consensus,
there is a unique equilibrium. Arbitration prevails if and only if it has low
cost, (α, δ) /∈ HC ∪MC , and this outcome occurs at t = 0. Otherwise a ne-
gotiated agreement is reached at t = 1. The negotiated partition ( 1
1+δ ,
δ
1+δ )
prevails under high cost arbitration, (α, δ) ∈ HC ; otherwise, when (α, δ) ∈
MC the split is (2(1−α)
2−α ,
α
2−α).
The following is now immediate.
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Corollary 12 too many negotiated agreements: Arbitration is never
used ineﬃciently since a negotiated agreement surely prevails when α < δ.
Still, eﬃciency and equilibrium remain unaligned, since HC ∪MC contains
a substantial region where arbitration is the superior procedure to solve the
dispute, α > δ, and yet players reach a negotiated agreement incurring the
higher cost (1− δ).
5 Arbitration on Principle
To complete our exploration we now consider arbitrators that act on prin-
ciple, ignoring the negotiation process that precedes their appointment, and
imposing a fair settlement independently of the state that the negotiations
have reached. That is, at all states (x1, x2,X) , the arbitrated share of both
players is
Ai =
1
2
.
When bargainers interact with such an arbitrator in the background,
either they ignore her, or they waste no time in appointing her. It turns out
that there is a simple threshold that separates scenarios for which agents opt
out to arbitration, below that threshold, arbitration is irrelevant and agents
behave as in Proposition 1. Furthermore, the consensus required to bring
in the arbitrator is irrelevant, the same outcome prevails if agents can do
it unilaterally or when they need the opponent’s approval. This results are
stated formally as Proposition 13 that follows. The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 13 arbitration on principle. Assume that the arbitrated
settlement is fixed at (1
2
, 1
2
). A unique equilibrium outcome prevails indepen-
dently of whether the decision to opt out to arbitration is unilateral or by
consensus. If α ≤ 2δ
1+δ then a negotiated agreement (
1
1+δ ,
δ
1+δ ) is reached at
t = 1; otherwise arbitration prevails at t = 0.
With a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes under each
arbitration system we may now compare their relative performance.
6 Comparing Arbitration Systems
Let us first consider arbitration systems with a unilateral appointment rule.
In this case, when α ∈
h
2δ
1+2δ , 1 + 2δ −
p
1 + 4δ2
i
a pragmatic arbitrator is
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not irrelevant, but agents do not appoint her either and a negotiated agree-
ment is reached. In contrast, at this set of scenarios, an arbitrator that
acts on principle is appointed. Observe that, as a consequence, the range of
scenarios in which arbitration is ineﬃciently used is greatly reduced by the
pragmatic conduct of the arbitrator.
When the arbitrator is pragmatic and mutual consent is required the
range of scenarios at which agents reach negotiated agreements is maximal.
In this case, in addition to scenarios at which negotiated agreements prevail
with a unilateral rule, negotiated agreements are reached at (δ, α) such that
α ∈
h
1 + 2δ −
p
1 + 4δ2,min
©
2δ2, 2δ
1+2δ
ªi
.
Hence, as the arbitrator’s conduct changes from acting on principle into
acting pragmatically the range of scenarios at which the arbitrator is not
appointed increases. And, similarly, negotiated agreements are more likely
as we move from unilateral pragmatic arbitration into pragmatic arbitration
by mutual consent.
An increase the range of parameters at which negotiated agreements pre-
vail does not necessarily implies an increase in eﬃciency, tough. The eﬃ-
ciency performance of each arbitration system depends on the likelihood of
the diﬀerent cost configurations.
When the distributions of the costs of negotiation and arbitration are
known, the (ex-ante) expected performance for each system of arbitration
can be evaluated based on ex-ante expected benefits.
Assume that negotiation and arbitration costs are distributed according
to some joint distribution F (α, δ) on [0, 1]2. Then the ex-ante benefits of
each system can be measured as follows.
Full eﬃciency is attained when the cheaper procedure is used for each
realization (α, δ). This yields ex-ante benefits
WE =
R
δ≥α
δdF +
R
δ<α
αdF. (1)
The expected benefits in the absence of an arbitrator are
WN =
R
all (α,δ)
δdF. (2)
The expected benefits under the unilateral pragmatic arbitration system are
WU =
R
(α,δ)∈H∪M
δdF +
R
((α,δ)/∈H∪M
αdF ; (3)
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and for pragmatic arbitration by consensus they are
WC =
R
(α,δ)∈HC∪M
δdF +
R
(α,δ)/∈HC∪M
αdF. (4)
When the arbitrator acts on principle the expected benefirs are
WOP =
R
(α,δ)∈H
δdF +
R
(α,δ)/∈H
αdF. (5)
In what follows we present two examples pointing out that in regular en-
vironments none of the three systems of arbitration can be dismissed a priori.
Each might be the (second best) optimal system under natural conditions.
Our first example considers environments where both costs are i.i.d. with
positive symmetric density.
Example 14 Assume that arbitration and negotiation costs are indepen-
dently and identically distributed in [0, 1] with a distribution with density
fρ(u) =
uρ−1(1− u)ρ−1
K(ρ)
,
where K(ρ) =
R 1
0
uρ−1(1− u)ρ−1 and ρ ≥ 1. Table 1 presents the ex-ante ex-
pected benefits for diﬀerent values of the parameter ρ. For each environment,
the optimal arbitration system is denoted with a ∗-superscript:
ρ
1
2
5
WE
.666
. 628
. 586
WN
.5
.5
.5
WU
.660
. 622∗
. 579
WC
.662∗
.620
. 576
WOP
. 657
.621
. 582∗
Table 1
i.i.d. costs with densities fρ(u) = u
ρ−1(1−u)ρ−1
K(ρ)
We now examine an example where the distributions of costs have up-
wards or downwards biases. We consider environments where both costs tend
to be high, environments where both tend to be low; and two asymmetric
environments where one cost tends to be high and the other tends to be low.
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Example 15 Assume that each cost is independently drawn from a distrib-
ution with a density either f(x) = 2x, or f(x) = 2(1 − x). Table 2 displays
the expected benefits under each system for each of the four possible joint
densities.
f(α, δ)
4αδ
4(1− α)(1− δ)
4(1− α)δ
4α(1− δ)
WE
.8
. 466
.7
.7
WN
.666
.333
.666
.333
WU
. 790
. 461
.696∗
.696
WC
. 794∗
. 460
.610
.696
WOP
. 778
. 463∗
.691
.697∗
Table 2
Asymmetric Environments
From the preceding examples we conclude that policy prescriptions con-
cerning arbitrator’s conduct or appointment rules require precise information
on the distribution of negotiation and arbitration cost.
7 Conclusions
Aiming to explore the impact of diﬀerent arbitration systems on negotiations,
we have characterized the equilibrium of concession bargaining games with
arbitration in the background. We summarize our findings in the following
three points:
1. Arbitration might alter the negotiated partition of the surplus relative
to the situation in which it is unavailable. This occurs only if the ar-
bitrated partition of the surplus is endogenous and the relative cost of
arbitration is not too high, since arbitration turns irrelevant when it is
excessively costly. When arbitration is relevant, the negotiation posi-
tions of the players approach those sustained by the arbitrator and the
first mover advantage is reduced. If the cost of arbitration is suﬃciently
low players immediately resort to arbitration, and an equal split of the
surplus prevails.
2. The requisite of mutual consent is of great consequence if the arbitrator
is pragmatic, but it is irrelevant when the arbitrator acts on principle.
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3. Arbitration cannot assure full eﬃciency. What system of arbitration
promotes the greater ex-ante gain in eﬃciency depends on the distrib-
ution of negotiation and arbitration costs.
Appendix
Unilateral Arbitration
Proof of Lemma 2: Player 1 chooses one of the following alternatives: a)
concede X and receive a payoﬀ of x1; b) concede nothing obtaining at most
δ(x1 + X) in the continuation; c) concede 0 < C1 < X, obtaining at most
δ(x1 +X − C1); d) Opt out to arbitration, which pays α(x1 + X2 ).
Since x1 > δ(x1 +X) > δ(x1 +X −C1) the optimal action is to concede
X provided that x1 > α(x1 + X2 ). For x1 > δ(x1 + X) the inequality x1 ≥
α(x1 +
X
2
) is equivalent to α ≤ 2δδ+1 . And if α >
2δ
δ+1 then player 1 opts
out in states where α(x1 + X2 ) > x1 since opting out dominates making any
concession.
Proof of Lemma 3: In scenario 1) Player 2 faces the situation analyzed in
Lemma 2 1); hence her optimal action is to concede X. Now consider Player
1: if she concedes nothing, player 2 will concede X in the following period,
and 1 obtains δ(x1+X). This payoﬀ is greater than what 1 would get if she
concedes X since δ(x1 + X) > x1. Likewise δ(x1 + X) > δ(x1 + X − C1)
implying that any C1, 0 < C1 < X is dominated as well. To rule out
arbitration simply observe that to call the arbitrator is in Player 1’s interest
only if α(x1 + X2 ) ≥ δ(x1 +X), and note that x1 < δ(x1 +X) and α ≤
2δ
1+δ
imply that the preceding inequality is impossible. To check 2) note that by
Lemma 2 2) Unless she receives a suﬃcient concession Player 2 will opt out
in the continuation. Thus the action of Player 1 must be either to opt out
to arbitration right away or to concede something that prevents arbitration,
the minimal concession achieves that is CA. Thus Player 1 opts out it if and
only if α(x1+ X2 ) ≥ δ(x1+X−CA1 ) and concedes CA1 otherwise. Notice that
CA1 = 0 for the states satisfying x1 > α(x1 +
X
2
).
Proof of Lemma 4: 1) Player 1 picks an action among the following
alternatives: a) concede X and obtain a payoﬀ of x1; b) concede C1 ≥
∼
C1
and obtain δ(x1+X−C1), where
∼
C1 is the minimal concession that leads the
game to a state where Lemma 3 1) applies and 2 concedes all the contested
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surplus at t+ 1, i.e. x2 +
∼
C1 = δ(x2 +X); c) concede 0 ≤ C1 <
∼
C1 ; and d)
propose arbitration, that yields payoﬀ of α(x1 + X2 ).
First of all note that b) is dominated by a): since x1 ≥ δ1+δ > δ(x1 +
X −
∼
C1) > δ(x1 + X − C1) . Next we check that a) dominates c) as well.
Consider C1 <
∼
C1 that leads to a state where Lemma 2 1) applies. Player 2
concedes nothing at her turn and Player 1 obtains δ2x1; that is dominated
by a). Hence C1 must be small enough so that the subsequent bargaining
state still lies in the set of bargaining states that we are presently examining.
Following such C1 <
∼
C1, 1 can expect from 2 at most
∼
C2, the concession that
leaves Player 1 ready to finish the game at her next turn. Thus C1 <
∼
C1
pays 1 at most δ2(x1 +
∼
C2). Substituting
∼
C2 = δ(x1 + X) − x1, we obtain
that x1 ≥ δ2(x1 +
∼
C2) is equivalent to x1 > δ3(x1 + X) and therefore a)
dominates c) in states that satisfy the later inequality. A recursive argument
completes the proof of the claim. Given δ there is a natural number such that
δn+1(x1+X) < x1 < δ
n(x1+X). Assume that in bargaining states satisfying
x1 < δ(x1+X), x2 < δ(x2+X), x1 ≥ δ1+δ and δ
n+1(x1+X) < x1, conceding
X dominates any other partial concession. In states such that x1 < δ(x1+X),
x2 < δ(x2 + X), x1 ≥ δ1+δ and x1 < δ
n(x1 + X) the concession that player
1 can expect in the following from player 2 is no greater than C2 such that
x1+C2 = δ
n(x1+X). Hence, the expected payoﬀ of from a concession smaller
than X, is no greater than δ2(x1+C1) = δ2+n(x1+X) < δn+1(x1+X) < x1
so that 1 is better of conceding X.
Next, we show that when α ≤ 2δ
1+2δ a) dominates d) because x1 ≥ α(x1+
X
2
). First note that α ≤ 2δ
1+2δ , i.e.
1
1+δ ≤
2(1−α)
2−α , implies that if x2 < δ(x2+X),
x1 < δ(x1 + X) and x1 ≥ δ1+δ then x1 ≥ α(x1 +
X
2
) since (1 − α)x1 ≥
(1− α) δ
1+δ ≥
α
2(1+δ) ≥
α
2
X.
The optimal actions of Player 1 for the parameters 2δ
2δ+1 < α ≤
2δ
δ+1
are easily proved. If x1 ≥ α(x1 + X2 ) a) clearly dominates d) and the other
alternatives and if x1 < α(x1+ X2 ) opting out is the preferred action of Player
1.
1. iii) follows from Lemma 3 2).
2) Is immediate from 1).
Proof of Lemma 5: 1) If α ≤ 2δ
1+2δ a concessionC
N
1 assures to 1 a payoﬀ
δ
1+δ
since Lemma 4 1) applies to Player 2 in the continuation so that she responds
conceding the rest of the pie. To concede more than CN1 is clearly dominated.
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To concede less is also dominated; in that case, at the new bargaining state,
Player 1 cannot expect to receive more than CN2 , such that x1 + C
N
2 =
δ
1+δ
so that by conceding less than CN1 , player 1 can get, at most,
δ3
1+δ <
δ
1+δ .
Arbitration is dominated by CN1 provided that
δ
1+δ ≥ α(x1 +
X
2
), which is
true when α ≤ 2δ
2δ+1 : Simply note that α
¡
x1 +
X
2
¢
≤ α
¡ δ
1+δ +
1
2
¡
1− δ
1+δ
¢¢
=
α
2
2δ+1
1+δ and that
α
2
2δ+1
1+δ <
δ
1+δ for all α <
2δ
2δ+1 .
2. Note first that opting out is dominated since either α(x1+ X2 ) ≤
δ
1+δ or
α(x1+
X
2
) ≤ δ(x1+X−CA1 ). Moreover, while conceding C
0
1 > C1 is obviously
dominated, a concession C
0
1 < C1 leads the game to the state where player
2 either opts out to arbitration or concedes C2 = Max
£
CA2 , C
N
2
¤
. The
first alternative pays δα(x1 +
X−C01
2
) < α(x1 +
X
2
) ≤ δ(x1 + X − C1), and
the second pays, at most, Max
n
δ3
1+δ ,
δ2α
2−α
o
and either Max
n
δ3
1+δ ,
δ2α
2−α
o
≤
2δ(1−α)
2−α ≤ δ(x1 + X − CA1 ) or Max
n
δ3
1+δ ,
δ2α
2−α
o
≤ δ
1+δ . Therefore Player 1
optimally concedes C1.
If 2δδ+1 < α then a concession C
N
1 cannot not induce a total concession by 2
in the continuation: In state (x1, δ1+δ ,X
0) Player 2 prefers a total concession
over arbitration if δ
1+δ ≥ α(
δ
1+δ +
X0
2
), while xi < δ1+δ implies that X
0 =
1−xi− δ1+δ ≥
1−δ
1+δ , which in turn implies that α ≤
2δ
1+δ . Hence, Player 1 must
chose either arbitration or CA1 , and concession C
A
1 dominates arbitration if
α(x1 +
X
2
) ≤ δ(x1 +X − CA1 ).
Arbitration by Consensus
Proof of Lemma 8: It suﬃces to observe that the proposal of arbitration
is always accepted by 2 whenever opting out is the optimal action of Player
1 under unilateral arbitration.
If α ≤ δ opting out is never optimal (see Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 3.1).
And if α > δ and Player 1 proposes arbitration, Player 2 will always accept
since α(x2 + X2 ) > δx2.
Proof of Lemma 9:1) The same arguments used in the proof of Lemma 4
establish that the optimal action is either a) concede X and obtain a payoﬀ
of x1 or d) propose arbitration, that yields payoﬀ of α(x1+ X2 ), provided that
2 accepts it.
Next, we show that when α ≤ 2δ
1+2δ = max
©
2δ
1+2δ , δ
ª
a) dominates d)
because x1 ≥ α(x1 + X2 ). First note that α ≤
2δ
1+2δ , i.e.
1
1+δ ≤
2(1−α)
2−α , implies
that if x2 < δ(x2 +X), x1 < δ(x1 +X) and x1 ≥ δ1+δ then x1 ≥ α(x1 +
X
2
)
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since (1−α)x1 ≥ (1−α) δ1+δ ≥
α
2(1+δ) ≥
α
2
X. If α ≤ δ = max
©
2δ
1+2δ , δ
ª
we find
states for which x1 < α(x1 + X2 ). However, Player 2 rejects the arbitration
proposal since α(x2 + X2 ) ≤ δ
2(x2 +X − CA2 ).
If 2δ
1+δ ≥ α > max
©
2δ
1+2δ , δ
ª
, then arbitration is no longer unanimously
dominated at all states under consideration. Total concession obviously dom-
inates arbitration for states where x1 ≥ α(x1 + X2 ). In states such that
x1 < α(x1 +
X
2
), Player 1 prefers arbitration over conceding X. Player 2
acceptance is guaranteed for states satisfying α(x2+ X2 ) ≥ δ
2(x2+X). Oth-
erwise Player 1 concedes X.
Let us now check the optimal actions of Player 1 in states where Player
2 (optimally) proposes arbitration. Note that concession CA1 assures that
Player 2 optimally concedes the rest of the pie next period. A concession
C1 > C
A
1 is clearly dominated. On the other hand the payoﬀ from C1 < C
A
1
is at most αδ(x1+ X−C12 ) < α(x1+
X
2
). And finally, to propose arbitration is
dominated by CA1 since α >
2δ
1+2δ , i.e.
1
1+δ . ≥
2(1−α)
2−α , implies that α(x1+
X
2
) ≤
α(α(1+δ)−δα(1+δ) ) <
2δ(1−α)
2−α ≤ δ(x1 +X − CA1 ).
The result for scenario v) follows from Lemma 8. Simply observe that
whenever Player 1 proposes arbitration, Player 2 accepts since α(x2 + X2 ) ≥
δ2(x2 +X − CA2 ).
2) Follows from immediately from 1).
Proof of Lemma 10:1) A concession CN1 assures to 1 a payoﬀ
δ
1+δ provided
that Lemma 9 1. i) applies to Player 2 in the continuation so that she
responds conceding the rest of the pie. To rule out concessions C1 6= CN1 we
argue as in the proof of Lemma 5. It remains to be checked that arbitration
is dominated as well. Arbitration is dominated by CN1 provided that
δ
1+δ ≥
α(x1 +
X
2
) = α
2
(1 + x1 − x2) and that it suﬃces that δ1+δ ≥
α
2
(1 + x1) which
is equivalent to x1 ≤ α−2δ(1−α)α(1+δ) . Assume that α ≤ max
©
2δ
1+2δ , δ
ª
holds and
α
¡
x1 +
X
2
¢
≥ δ
1+δ , acceptance by Player 2 requires that α
¡
x2 +
X
2
¢
≥ δ2
1+δ .
Both inequalities combined imply that α > δ. Hence, δ < α < 2δ
2δ+1 but
the later inequality contradicts that α
¡
x1 +
X
2
¢
≥ δ
1+δ : Simply note that
α
¡
x1 +
X
2
¢
≤ α
¡ δ
1+δ +
1
2
¡
1− δ
1+δ
¢¢
= α
2
2δ+1
1+δ and that
α
2
2δ+1
1+δ <
δ
1+δ for all
α < 2δ
2δ+1 .
2) Note that if Player 1 proposes arbitration Player 2 will accept since
either α(x2 + X2 ) > δx2 or α(x2 +
X
2
) > δ2(x2 +X) > δ2(x2 +X − Ci). By
the same arguments used in the proof of Lemma 5 we prove that Player 1
concedes C1 =Max
©
CA1 , C
N
1
ª
whenever α(x1+ X2 ) 6 δ(x1+X−C1) or else
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she proposes arbitration.
3) If x1 6 2δ
2−α
α(1+δ) a concession of C
N
1 gives Player 1 a payoﬀ of
δ
1+δ since
Player 2 concedes X in the following period (Lemma 9 1) iii). To concede
more than CN1 is clearly a dominated option, and to concede C
0
1 < C
N
1 leads
the game to a state where Player 2 concedes, at most, C2 =Max
©
CN2 , C
A
2
ª
.
In those cases δ
1+δ > Max
n
δ3
1+δ ,
δ2α
2−α
o
≥ δ2(x1+X−C
0
1). Arbitration is also
dominated since α(x1 + X2 ) ≤
δ
1+δ for x1 ≤
2δ2−α
α(1+δ) .
Next we show that the optimal action of Player 1 is a concession C1 =
Max
©
CN1 , C
A
1
ª
whenever x1 > 2δ
2−α
α(1+δ) . To concede more than C1 is easily
ruled out. And to concede C
0
1 < C1 leads the game to a state where either
Lemma 9.2 applies or still lies in the set of states that we are presently
examining. If Player 2 makes a concession in the following period, Player 1
will get, at most,Max
n
δ3
1+δ ,
δ2α
2−α
o
< δ(x1+X−C1) and if Player 2 proposes
arbitration, Player 1 will get δα(x1 +
X−C01
2
) < δ(x1 +X − C1) .
There are states where Player 1 prefers arbitration rather than conceding
C1. But Player 2 rejects this proposal since α(x2 + X2 ) <
δ2
1+δ .
4) Observe that if α > 2δ
1+δ , then a concession C
N
1 cannot not induce
a total concession by 2 in the continuation: In state (x1, δ1+δ ,X
0) Player 2
prefers total concession over arbitration if δ
1+δ ≥ α(
δ
1+δ +
X0
2
), while xi < δ1+δ
implies that X 0 = 1 − xi − δ1+δ ≥
1−δ
1+δ , which in turn implies that α ≤
2δ
1+δ .
Hence, Player 1 must chose either arbitration or CA1 , and concession C
A
1
dominates the proposal of arbitration if α(x1 + X2 ) ≤ δ(x1 +X − CA1 ).
Arbitration on Principle
Proof of Proposition 13:
It is easy to check that when the payoﬀs from arbitration are fixed at α
2
,
the optimal actions at each of the four possible state configurations are as
stated in Claims 1 to 4.
Claim 1: Consider states where x1 ≥ δ(x1 + X). A) Assume unilateral
appointment. If x1 ≥ α2 , then Player 1 concedes X; otherwise Player 1 opts
out to arbitration. B) Assume appointment by mutual consent. If x1 ≥ α2 or
δx2 ≥ α2 , then Player 1 concedes X; otherwise Player 1 proposes arbitration.
Claim 2: Consider states where x1 < δ(x1 +X) and x2 ≥ δ(x2 +X). A)
Assume unilateral appointment. A1) If δ
1+δ ≥
α
2
and δ(x1 +X) ≥ α2 Player
1 concedes nothing. A2) If δ
1+δ ≥
α
2
and δ(x1 + X) < α2 Player 1 opts out
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. A3) And if δ
1+δ ≥
α
2
she opts out to arbitration. B) Assume appointment
by mutual consent. If δx2 ≥ α2 Player 1 concedes nothing; otherwise she
proposes arbitration whenever δ(x1 +X) < α2 or else she concedes nothing.
Claim 3: Consider states where xi < δ(xi + X), i = 1, 2. A) Assume
unilateral appointment. A1) Assume x1 ≥ δ1+δ .i) If
δ
1+δ ≥
α
2
then Player 1
concedes X. ii) If δ
1+δ <
α
2
then Player 1 concedes X whenever x1 ≥ α2 ,
otherwise she opts out. A2) Assume x2 ≥ δ1+δ . i) If α ≤
2δ
1+δ then Player 1
concedes nothing whenever δ(x1 + X) ≥ α2 or else opts out to arbitration.
ii) If α > 2δ
1+δ Player 1 opts out to arbitration. B) Assume appointment by
mutual consent. B1) Assume x1 ≥ δ1+δ . If α ≤
2δ
1+δ then Player 1 concedes
X; otherwise she proposes arbitration. B2) Assume x2 ≥ δ1+δ . Then Player
1 concedes nothing if α ≤ 2δ
1+δ , otherwise she proposes arbitration.
Claim 4: Consider states such that xi < δ1+δ i = 1, 2.A) Assume unilateral
appointment. If α ≤ 2δ
1+δ , then Player 1 concedes C
N
1 ; otherwise she opts out
to arbitration. B) Assume appointment by mutual consent. If α ≤ 2δ
1+δ , then
Player 1 concedes CN1 ; otherwise she proposes arbitration.
Proposition 13 is now immediate form Claims 3 and 4.
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